The Unconscious as an ultrametric set by Lauro Grotto, Rosapia

535Rosapia Lauro-Grotto
American Imago, Vol. 64, No. 4, 535–543. © 2008 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
535
ROSAPIA LAURO-GROTTO
The Unconscious as an Ultrametric Set
To my Icarus (Jazz)
This paper illustrates the recontextualization of a formal theory 
from the domain of cognitive science to psychoanalysis. Starting from 
an approach driven by information theory, a description of mental space 
in terms of a peculiar topographical structure is derived. This “ultra-
metric” structure can be seen to fit the constraints of primary process 
thinking, as presented by Matte Blanco in his essays on bi-logic. The 
author’s reformulation of the distinction between primary and second-
ary processes in topological terms leads to a speculative proposal of 
“quasi-symbols” as possible objects of mental life. The paper also seeks 
to capture some aspects of the crucial interplay between the phenom-
enological experience of personal change and the proposed conceptual 
advance in theorization.
The theme of my writing is an observation, and the search 
for meaning that came after it. As I am so used to scientific 
English, I feel I should apologize for the personal style of this 
text, which may even be too intimate at some points. Let us go 
step by step, however.
My observation concerns a homology, an identity in the 
deep structure of two ways of thinking about the mind, which 
may appear very distant at a first glance.
My field is cognitive neuroscience; recently, I have been 
working on a method aimed at investigating “What Remains of 
Memories” (Lauro-Grotto, Borgo, Piccini, and Treves 1997)—
what remains of memories when age or illness deprives us of 
our tools to remember. Don’t be misled by my opening. We 
are dealing here with a quantitative method based on Shan-
non information theory (Shannon 1948). This type of analysis 
is commonly used in decoding single cell recordings. When an 
animal is trained to identify a set of visual stimuli, the activity 
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traces of the cells involved in the recognition process can be 
interpreted in terms of the degree of similarity among pairs 
of recordings in such a way that one can get an idea of the 
structure of the set of neural representations that code for the 
stimuli. I am not fond of laboratory animal studies, but I find 
that the method is very intriguing as it allows us to access some 
very deep characteristics of mental images. Thus, I devoted 
myself to the development of a version of the task that can be 
employed with behavioral data, in the classic format of a paper 
and pencil neuropsychological test.
The stimuli I present are pictures of famous people from 
several decades, and they must be classified in a grid of seman-
tic dimensions, such as nationality and profession. When the 
subject fails to recognize the picture, he or she is nevertheless 
required to provide the most plausible classification. By analyz-
ing the confusion matrix—that is, the matrix presenting both 
correct and incorrect classifications—it is possible to derive a 
quantitative index providing an estimate of the extent of the 
relationships of similarity that the subject is able to perceive in 
the set of stimuli. This is an indirect estimate of the richness 
of the conceptual structure underlying the classification, and it 
is obtained from the way in which it is reflected in the experi-
mental data. The index we derive is called the metric content of 
the mental representations; metric content manifests itself in 
the actual behavior of the subject as recorded in the confusion 
matrix.1
My results are mainly based on work with patients suffering 
from neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s dementia, 
but the same method has been applied to track the evolution of 
semantic representations through different phases of life, from 
youth to senescence. Along the entire life span, semantic mem-
ory—the mental lexicon in which our knowledge of the world 
is stored and organized—is slowly enriched by new incoming 
information, while the network of links and associations among 
concepts gets more and more entangled. Not surprisingly, there 
is a simultaneous increase of information and of the metric 
content. It may be less trivial to find that, in dementia, when 
neural resources do progressively and inexorably shrink, the 
loss of information content is paralleled by a marked increase 
in the metric content of the representations. It is as though the 
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semantic network tends to become increasingly dominated by 
similarities and less sensitive to differences. The mind, I might 
propose, having less space at its disposal in order to note down 
its knowledge, say, about dogs and cats, resorts to keeping a 
common image for the two concepts and gets rid of all the 
distinctive features that would keep the two concepts apart. A 
new “dog-cat” super-class is thus created, and in this class all the 
individual attributes are either shared or get lost.
The tendency to generate clusters of concepts that in turn 
become more and more homogeneous in their inner structure 
can be described mathematically as a transition from a metric 
space to an ultrametric one. Both metricity and ultrametricity 
are topological properties, in the sense that they define “who 
is close to whom” in a spatial representation of a given set.
In a metric semantic space, a concept such as “cat” would 
be closer to the concept “dog” than to either “butterfly” or 
“car” (maybe with an unexpected discontinuity if we think of 
the gatto delle nevi or “snow cat,” an Italian expression meaning 
a machine to make ski trails, just to remind ourselves of how 
creative language is!). If a semantic space has an ultrametric 
structure, on the contrary, all the items are organized in a hi-
erarchical sequence of clusters of increasing generality, while 
inside each cluster all the concepts are equidistant from each 
other, as is the case for the vertices of an equilateral triangle. In 
an ultrametric set, if two concepts are found to belong to the 
same cluster they become ipso facto indistinguishable; to some 
extent, they are interchangeable with each other and with the 
whole cluster as well. This strange state of affairs has the remark-
able consequence that proper parts and the whole of the set 
are to be considered as equivalent to each other.
“Remarkable consequence,” I have just written, which is 
vaguely surprising to me as for many years I simply ignored it. 
This was until I came across a quotation from Matte Blanco in a 
book by Carli and Paniccia called Analysis of the Request (2003). 
In italics, on the penultimate line on page 38, I found the 
expression “sets of symmetry” (sacche di simmetria). My former 
heart of a theoretical physicist gave a sudden start. Indeed, there 
was a time when I too shared the belief that “symmetry” and 
“symmetry breaking” would be powerful words able to reduce 
to order the state of the world.
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I sought out the texts by Matte Blanco, The Unconscious as 
Infinite Sets (1975), first of all, and a few months later the origi-
nal version of Thinking, Feeling, and Being (1988). These books 
contain a brilliant reformulation of the epistemological founda-
tions of classical psychoanalytic theory from Freud to Melanie 
Klein. Even more fascinating to me, they offer a taxonomy of 
mental life, such as it manifests itself both in clinical practice 
and in the individual experience of the author.2
According to Matte Blanco, two opposite and apparently 
irreducible and contradictory ways of being do coexist in men-
tal life: the asymmetric or heterogeneous mode, following the 
rules of classical reasoning, and the symmetric or homogeneous 
mode, which can be described as a system of logic operating 
on the basis of two fundamental principles.
The first principle, known as the generalization principle, 
states that:
The system Ucs. treats an individual thing (person, object, 
concept) as if it were a member or element of a set or 
class which contains other members; it treats this class as 
a subclass of a more general class, and this more general 
class as a subclass or subset of a more general class, and 
so on. (Matte Blanco 1975, 38)
The second principle, known as the symmetry principle, holds: 
“The system Ucs. treats the converse of any relation as identical 
with the relation. In other words, it treats asymmetrical relations 
as if they were symmetrical” (38).
Matte Blanco shows us how to derive from these two prin-
ciples alone the whole set of features that, according to the 
first Freudian topography, characterize unconscious mental 
activity—i.e., the absence of mutual exclusion and negation, 
displacement, condensation, atemporality, and the substitution 
of the inner for the external world. Every mental phenomenon, 
from abstract thinking to emotion, seems to be marked by the 
co-presence in various proportions of the symmetric and the 
asymmetric modes: the mind is bilogical in structure.
Now, here comes my observation: the structural uncon-
scious, in the way it is reformulated by Matte Blanco, the symmet-
ric mode—all this is homologous to an ultrametric structure. The 
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generalization principle reflects the hierarchical arrangement 
in which all the stimuli (or concepts) are perceived as belong-
ing to classes, and the classes are clustered into super-classes 
of increasing generality. Finally, a single omni-comprehensive 
class is generated.
The symmetry principle reflects the property of the ultra-
metric organization according to which all the elements of a 
given class are equidistant from each other, and all of them are 
placed at the same distance from any other element of any dif-
ferent class. This formulation is appropriately captured in a cor-
ollary of the second principle, stating that “when the principle 
of symmetry is applied there can be no relations of contiguity 
between the parts of a whole” (Matte Blanco 1975, 40).
As I have already pointed out, distance in a semantic space 
can be read out as a measure of the difference among concepts. 
In an ultrametric set, all the concepts are at the same distance 
from each other, all the possible “positions” are to be considered 
as equivalent, and there is no way to distinguish one position 
from the other.
Let us try to refine our intuition of this alien situation by 
considering a single ultrametric class comprising three concepts: 
within ordinary Euclidean space we can imagine them to be 
placed at the vertices of an equilateral triangle. An ultrametric 
structure could be considered to be isomorphic to an ordinary 
metric structure of two-dimensional space (the equilateral 
triangle) only if we were to assume that every vertex of this 
triangle is found at exactly the same distance from every other 
point of the ordinary space. Maybe this is too much even for 
our intuition!
However, we know that something similar can actually be 
experienced in finite space when we look at a very distant three-
dimensional structure and we perceive it as though it were a 
single point. Symmetrization of relationships can therefore be 
described as a transition from a metric to an ultrametric con-
ceptual organization. Deployment, as Matte Blanco terms the 
inverse phenomenon, amounts to the opposite shift, from an 
ultrametric to a metric structure: in the course of deployment, 
therefore, there is an apparent increase of the available informa-
tion and contradictory aspects come to be evident as well.
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For a long time I have been wondering what this might 
mean. Is what I see in my neurological patients perhaps a “re-
version to the unconscious,” and does this structural reorgani-
zation open a pathway that runs from memory to oblivion? In 
other words, is someone daring enough to take seriously the 
notion that unconscious mental activity might correspond to a 
conceptualization in ultrametric space? To this day, I am at a 
loss to understand why such an elegant way of thinking about 
the human mind as bi-logic is not a more commonly shared 
heritage among psychologists, to say nothing about philosophers 
of mind.
At present, the cognitive sciences seem to be devoted to 
perpetuating an endless and unproductive conflict between the 
symbolic paradigm and the subsymbolic neurocomputational 
paradigm. The human mind as a pure symbol processor is a 
strictly computational mind, an encapsulated mind to some 
extent, while for many neurophysiologists the mind is basically 
a pattern associator, mainly driven by external data. The sole 
choice appears to be between, on the one hand, the complete 
absence of friction of pure symbols, which can be manipulated 
effortlessly and whose purchase on reality can be ignored by 
syntax, and, on the other hand, fixed-point dynamics, which 
arrive at generalizations by extracting common features. In 
fixed-point dynamics, similar inputs always produce more or 
less the same output. In either case, there is no unconscious 
anywhere, if you do not restrict unconscious activities to sub-
liminal phenomena or background noise in the brain, out of 
the spotlight of consciousness itself.
I find this state of my discipline to be quite depressing, and 
I often share the mood that J. A. Fodor so poignantly expresses 
with the words of Eeyore: “Still snowing [Nevica ancora]. And it’s 
freezing cold. At least we haven’t had an earthquake recently” 
(2001, 9).3 However, if neither the symbolic nor the subsymbolic 
paradigm provides a satisfactory solution, perhaps in the end 
it might not be such a bad thing if the mind were a bit of a 
stranger to itself. As in any relationship, perceiving “otherness” 
is the ineluctable condition for starting the quest . . .
Even harder for me to cope with, moreover, is the “funda-
mental antinomy of human beings and the world” that, accord-
ing to Matte Blanco (1988), the bi-logical structure of the mind 
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would imply.4 Why is this? Why should the mind appear to us 
as something so irreducibly different from any other natural 
phenomenon?
From the dawn of life, experience engraves and models 
our inner landscapes, and perhaps what I have called semantic 
memory is no more than such a landscape. Experience unfolds 
in time, and time revolves everything, changing opposites into 
one other. Emotional experience, relational experience is 
contradictory: it creates tensions in any structure devoted to 
its reception. Individual memory of past events, episodic and 
autobiographical in nature, can be depicted as a thread that is 
entangled in nodes and webs, a one-dimensional line that, due 
to bending and folding, becomes like a shimmering surface by 
which we catch a glimpse of our precarious identity and of our 
knowledge of the world.
Or maybe this is the picture I had in my mind while I was 
inquiring about the meaning of my metric content estimates, 
by aligning a visual association with the formalized concept. 
This numerical index would therefore remain in effect for the 
outcome of the folding process, the torsion the thread under-
goes, or the extent of the packing on a hypothetical bundle of 
experiences . . . 
Prompted by this picture, I began to consider the possibility 
that ultrametricity could be used as a means to generate mental 
representations that hold in their inner structure all the con-
tradictory aspects of experience and present a smooth surface 
allowing a kind of “easy handling” by mental processes.
I would call these hypothetical items of mental life quasi-
symbols—as this is what they are, at least of my mental life.5 In 
them the contradictory content of experience is condensed, so 
that the past remains pliable enough to allow for memory and 
narration, and the future retains enough freedom for imagina-
tion to wander.
Such is dreaming, such is the creative mental image, and 
such the intimate nature of words. If I say mother, my mind rings 
out with the ultimate good and bad of presence and absence . . . 
In the crucible of emotional life our experience grows dense 
in the form of our personal inner language, in the existential 
lexicon that we may perhaps have learned to interpret through 
psychoanalysis, but which, nevertheless, we have been using for 
so long in daily communication among ourselves.
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Its peace made with itself, the mind unfolds her wings 
in reality, it lets the sun gently dry them and breathes deeply, 
preparing for the next bound . . . Let’s go!
Department of Psychology
Università degli Studi di Firenze




1. See Lauro-Grotto (2006). This paper describes the theoretical background of the 
method and its operationalization in the form of a neuropsychological test. The 
trend of the metric content in aging and dementia is explored in Ciaramelli, 
Lauro-Grotto, and Treves (2007).
2. A very clear introduction to the work of Matte Blanco can be found in Rayner 
and Tuckett (1998).
3. Fodor, of course, is alluding to the melancholy donkey in A. A. Milne’s Winnie the 
Pooh, written in 1924. “Nevica ancora” is also the subtitle of the essay that Fodor 
derived from his so-called Italian Lectures, a series of talks the philosopher gave 
at the San Raffaele Institute in Milan in the summer of 1998. There he discusses 
the stakes and the limits of what he calls the “New Synthesis” in the cognitive 
sciences. This paradigm, according to Fodor, combines aspects of Chomsky’s in-
natism and neo-Cartesianism with neo-Darwinian elements and the fundamental 
assumption of massive modularity in order to provide a comprehensive account of 
mental functions. Hélas! This very promising explanatory scheme is shipwrecked 
on the reef of the lack of constraints on abductive thinking—that is, reasoning 
from effects back to causes—or what is known as the “frame problem.”
4. The third chapter of Matte Blanco’s book is entirely devoted to this theme; nev-
ertheless, in the same chapter an opening can be found to a future perspective in 
which bi-logic could be reformulated in terms of a unitary super-logic that unfolds 
in symmetric and asymmetric modes of being. The redescription of bi-logic in 
terms of metricity and ultrametricity should be seen as moving in this direction 
as both are mathematical properties of the topology of space. Ultrametricity has 
also been introduced in theoretical physics by Giorgio Parisi (Mézard, Parisi, and 
Virasoro 1987) in order to describe spin glass systems, a type of complex system 
not very different from neural networks. A Hopfield neural network does in fact 
show a spontaneous transition from a metric to an ultrametric regime when the 
storage capacity limit of the system is exceeded. Not only might it therefore be the 
case that a unique conceptualization could express the characteristic of bi-logic, 
but we might also have a putative neural model for it.
5. To my knowledge there is no model of any physical system that can express metric 
properties at the global level while conforming to an ultrametric organization at 
the local level, as I would claim should be the case for quasi-symbols. 
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